For more than seventeen years, Bernard Madoff operated what was viewed as one of the most successful investment strategies in the world. This strategy ultimately collapsed in December 2008 in what financial experts are calling one of the most detrimental Ponzi schemes in history. Many large and otherwise sophisticated bankers, hedge funds, and funds of funds have been hit by his alleged fraud. In this paper, we review some of the red flags that any operational due diligence and quantitative analysis should have identified as a concern before investing. We highlight some of the salient operational features common to best-of-breed hedge funds, features that were clearly missing from Madoff's operations.
A former friend of ours
The man had an impeccable reputation on Wall Street. He was on the shortlist of guests to every family birthday, anniversary, bar mitzvah, wedding and graduation. His firm was ranked as one of the top market makers in NASDAQ stocks. His solid and consistent track record generated a mixture of amazement, fascination, and curiosity. Investing with him was an exclusive privilege-a clear sign that one had made it socially. Bernard Madoff (hereafter: Madoff) was a legend. Admired by most, venerated by some, Madoff was a great success, so great that very few could dare criticise him without putting their careers in jeopardy. His house of cards nevertheless collapsed on December 11, 2008, when news broke that the FBI had arrested him and charged him and his brokerage firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (hereafter: BMIS), with securities fraud. According to the SEC's complaint, Madoff himself informed two of his senior employees that his investment advisory business was "just one big lie" and "basically, a giant Ponzi scheme".
Hedge fund failures usually generate a great deal of press coverage. The Madoff case was no exception. According to the Wall Street Journal, the trouble began when Madoff suffered reversals. Rather than admit losses, he decided to pay out existing investors with money coming in from new ones. Things then got worse as redemptions increased and new investor money dried up.
While his story seems eerily reminiscent of the dramatic fall of the $450 million Bayou Funds in August 2005, the size of the potential loss is likely to be far greater: up to $50 billion, according Madoff himself. The SEC investigations have just started and are likely to last several years, given the complexity of the case. The ability to invest with Madoff was officially not open to all, but the names of the potential victims have been widely bandied about in the press and their number seems to be growing with the speed and force of a hurricane. These victims include charitable organisations, pension funds, well-todo individuals, and celebrities, as well as numerous investment professionals, reputable banks, hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. As of January 6, 2009, more than 8,000 claim forms had been mailed to Madoff customers seeking protection under the Securities Investor Protection Act.
All Madoff investors should in retrospect kick themselves for not asking more questions before investing. As many of them have learned there is no substitute for due diligence. Indeed, as discussed in this paper, there were a number of red flags in Madoff's investment advisory business that should have been identified as serious concerns and warded off potential clients.
Introduction

Historical Review
Born on April 29, 1938, Bernard L. Madoff graduated from Far Rockaway High School in 1956. He attended Hofstra University Law School but never graduated. In the early 1960s, he created BMIS with an initial capital of $5,000 earned from working as a lifeguard during the summer and installing refrigeration systems.
From Brokerage to Advisory
Initially, BMIS was a pure brokerage business. It quoted bid and ask prices via the National Quotation Bureau's Pink Sheets and executed OTC transactions on behalf of its clients. Very rapidly, the firm embraced technology to disseminate its quotes and started focusing on electronic trading. In the 1980s, Madoff discovered that NYSE Rule 390 allowed him to trade NYSE-listed stocks away from the floor, which members of the NYSE could not do. Madoff therefore listed as a member of the then near-defunct Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE) and spent over $250,000 upgrading the CSE computers, transforming it into the first all-electronic computerised stock exchange.
Armed with the technology to trade faster, cheaper and longer hours, BMIS went after order flow. Initiating a controversial practice, BMIS paid other brokers $0.01 per share to execute their retail market orders, while still ensuring quality execution. Given that NYSE specialists were charging for order flow, this legal kickback rapidly convinced other brokers to redirect to BMIS a significant share of the trading volume, creating what was known as "the third market". Later, BMIS was also one of the five broker-dealers most closely involved in developing the NASDAQ Stock Market, where Madoff served as a member of the board of governors in the 1980s and as chairman of the board of directors.
By 1989, BMIS was a market maker handling more than 5% of the trading volume on the NYSE. But the brokerage business was becoming increasingly competitive and margins were shrinking. Madoff therefore decided to create a separate investment advisory firm, which he located one floor below his brokerage business.
In 2008, BMIS had $700 million of equity capital and handled approximately 10% of the NYSE trading volume. Its 200 employees (100 people in trading, fifty in technology, and fifty in the back office) were divided between New York and London, but only twelve of them were assigned to the famous split-strike conversion strategy devised by Madoff.
Madoff Feeders
It was often written in the press that Madoff operated a hedge fund or a series of hedge funds. This is factually incorrectthere has never been a "Madoff fund" and Madoff never claimed to be a hedge fund manager. Madoff simply claimed that BMIS was able to execute a conservative strategy that would deliver annual returns of 10% to 12% per year by actively trading a very specific portfolio of stocks and options. But access to this coveted strategy was by invitation only-merely being rich was not in itself sufficient.
In early 2008, according to its Form ADV, BMIS was managing twenty-three discretionary accounts for a total of $17 billion. Most of these accounts belonged to feeder funds which were marketed to investors worldwide by numerous intermediaries or used as underlying assets for structured products, leveraged investments, and so on. This very specific structure meant that Madoff's final investors were not direct customers of BMIS. They had to invest via one of the approved feeders which in turn had to open a brokerage account and delegate to BMIS the full trading authority of their portfolios.
As a result, investors were able to due diligence their feeder funds but not BMIS. As we will see shortly, this was an essential feature of the Madoff scheme.
The Split-Strike Conversion Strategy
The strategy officially used by Madoff was in theory remarkably simple-a combination of a protective put and a covered call. It can be summarised as follows: 1. Buy a basket of stocks highly correlated to the S&P 100 index. 2. Sell out-of-the-money call options on the S&P 100 with a notional value similar to that of the long equity portfolio. This creates a ceiling value beyond which further gains in the basket of stocks are offset by the increasing liability of the short call options. 3. Buy out-of-the money put options on the S&P 100 with a notional value similar to that of the long equity portfolio. This creates a floor value below which further declines in the value of the basket of stocks are offset by gains in the long put options.
The terminal payoff of the resulting position is illustrated in exhibit 1. Option traders normally refer to it as a "collar" or a "bull spread". Some traders also call it a "vacation trade" because you can establish the position and not worry about it until the expiration date of the options approaches. Madoff referred to it as a "split-strike conversion".
The aim of collars is usually to provide some downside protection at a cost lower than that of buying puts alone-the cost of purchasing the puts is mitigated by the proceeds from selling the calls. In addition, collars are commonly used to exploit the option skew, i.e., a situation in which atthe-money call premiums are higher than the at-the-money put premiums. Overall, the cost of a collar varies as a function of the relative levels of the exercise prices, the implied volatility smiles of the underlying options, and the maturity of the strategy. Officially, Madoff claimed to implement this strategy over short-term horizonsusually less than a month. The rest of the time, the portfolio was allegedly in cash.
Madoff's promise was to return 8% to 12% a year reliably, no matter what the markets did. A sample track record is shown in exhibit 2. Although results could vary from one feeder to another as a result of fees, leverage and other factors, all of them did in general post persistently smooth positive returns. Over his seventeen-year track record, Madoff apparently delivered an impressive total return of 557%, with no down year and almost no negative months (less than 5% of the time).
The stability of this track record, combined with its positive skewness, was one of the most compelling arguments for investing with Madoff. Returns were good but not outsized, and their consistency made it seem as if the outcome of the strategy were almost predictable. A perfect investment for a conservative portfolio and an even more perfect investment to leverage for an aggressive one… As an illustration, exhibit 3 compares the cumulative performance of the strategy and that of the S&P 100 index. Returns are comparable (11.2% p.a. for the Fairfield Sentry fund versus 8.5% p.a. for the S&P 100) but the difference in volatility is striking (2.5% p.a. for Fairfield Sentry versus 14.8% for the S&P 100). The difference in maximum drawdown is also great (-0.6% p.a. for the fund versus -49.1% for the S&P 100).
The Fraud
On December 10, 2008, Madoff confessed to his two sons, his brother and his wife that his investment advisory business was "a giant Ponzi scheme". In the evening, his sons turned him in to US authorities. Madoff was arrested the next day and charged with securities fraud. The SEC filed a complaint in federal court in Manhattan seeking an asset freeze and the appointment of a receiver for BMIS. 
Historical Review
A Long List of Red Flags
Hedge fund failures should always be seen at best as an opportunity to revisit and eventually update one's own due diligence process and at worst as a way to learn useful lessons from past mistakes. In that respect, the Madoff case is truly fascinating. The alleged Ponzi scheme was probably extremely difficult to detect. But the list of due diligence red flags was so long and unsettling that it should have deterred potential investors.
Operational Red Flags
Lack of segregation amongst service providers As discussed by Lhabitant (2006), a typical hedge fund uses a network of service providers that normally includes an investment manager to manage the assets, a broker (or several brokers) to execute trades, a fund administrator to calculate the NAV, and a custodian/prime broker (or more than one) to custody the positions. These service providers work together but should normally be independent of each other and their functions segregated, as this segregation plays a major role in reducing the risk of fraud. In a few cases, such as with some more complex or less liquid strategies, investors may accept some dependence between service providers, but the potential conflicts of interest should then be mitigated by the implementation of regular external independent controls and documented procedures.
With Madoff, all the above-mentioned functions were performed internally and with no third-party oversight. Madoff traded his managed accounts through his affiliated broker-dealer BMIS, which also executed and cleared these trades. More importantly, all assets were custodied and administered within his organisation, which also produced all documents showing the underlying investments. In a traditional hedge fund, this would have been a clear no-go for all investors, as it makes performance manipulation possible and substantially increases the risk of the misappropriation of assets, since there is no third party independently confirming the legal ownership of the fund's securities. In a managed account run in parallel with a hedge fund, the fund manager may control the account but the client's bank or custodian normally conducts administration and periodically provides the client with the net value of the assets. But with Madoff, this was reasonable because he was a broker-dealer running a series of managed accounts. The absence of independently calculated net asset value was normal-with a broker, you get only brokerage statements. And the requirement to custody with Madoff also seemed reasonable, given his core business activities. Finally, managed accounts were the only possible vehicles with which to access the strategy.
Of course, most Madoff feeder funds had independent and reputable service providers, which was reassuring for final investors. These providers had no choice but to rely on Madoff himself, or on his auditor, rather than on an independent broker or custodian, to verify the existence and accuracy of the trading information. 
Obscure auditors
Unusual fee structure
Since BMIS was not operating a fund, the way the firm was rewarded for its investment services should also have thrown up red flags. Officially, there was no management or performance fee at BMIS-the sole form of compensation, according to its Form ADV, was a "market rate" commission charged on each trade. As a result, the distributors of the feeder funds could charge final investors a management and/or a performance fee-usually 2% and 20%. This unusual fee model should have been questioned by investors. If Madoff's scheme for making money was really so good, why sell it at all? Why would BMIS forgo hundreds of millions of dollars of management fees and performance fees every year and let a few third-party distributors get them while investors were lining up to give him money? These heavy family links should also have been questioned by investors, as they compromised the independence of the functions. This is an obvious weakness of the internal controls meant to safeguard investors' assets from fraudulent activities.
Heavy family influence
No Madoff mention
At the feeder funds, several of the private placement memoranda and marketing materials never mentioned the Madoff or BMIS names. They disclosed merely that they allocated assets to "one manager who uses a 'split-strike' strategy". Final investors were therefore not necessarily aware that they were investing with Madoff. When questioned on this point, the feeder distributors usually answered that they were prohibited by contract from mentioning the Madoff or BMIS name. And Madoff was also very reluctant to disclose his actual assets under management. This was highly surprising, given the success of the strategy. A simple comparison of track records would easily show that there were multiple Madoff feeders, so why bother?
Lack of staff
In its regulatory filing, BMIS indicated that it had between one and five employees who performed investment advisory functions, including research. Simultaneously, it disclosed $17 billion of assets under management. Who could believe that such a large sum of money could really be managed by such a small group of people?
SEC registration
Madoff registered as an investment advisor with the SEC only in September 2006. Until then, he avoided registration and its subsequent disclosure rules by exploiting a regulatory loophole that allowed investment advisors with fewer than fifteen clients not to register. Madoff had fewer than fifteen feeders in his strategy and was allowed to count each feeder as one client, regardless of the number of final investors. So he could operate under the radar and avoid random SEC audits.
In 2006, the SEC changed the rules and required advisors to count each final investor as a client for registration purposes rather than counting one fund as a single client. Even so, Madoff still did not register. It was only after an SEC investigation that he admitted he had more than fifteen final clients and therefore had to register. Later, when the SEC lifted its counting rule, Madoff did not de-register as many other managers subsequently did. Many of his investors may have been reassured by his decision to remain registered, but what they probably did not know was that Madoff's post-registration investment advisory business had never been investigated.
Extreme secrecy
According to investors, access to Madoff's offices for on-site due diligence was very limited or even denied. Madoff refused to answer questions about his business or about his investment strategies. He never provided any explanations or monthly performance attribution, even informally, and some investors, who asked what he thought were too many questions, were threatened with expulsion. Such an attitude is very unusual in the hedge fund world. Even the most secretive hedge funds are usually willing to demonstrate to investors that they have quality operations and provide operational transparency. None of this was available with Madoff.
Paper tickets
While most brokers provide their customers with timely, electronic access to their accounts, Madoff never did so. Feeder funds that had some level of transparency on the investment strategy were only able to receive paper tickets by mail at the end of the day. On some occasions, the paper tickets had no time stamps, so the exact order of the purported transaction was unclear-officially, protection from others who might try to replicate it or trade against it. This practice, combined with the lack of segregation of key functions noted above, provided the end-of-the-day ability to manufacture trade tickets that confirmed investment results.
Conflict of interest
Another potential conflict of interest was that BMIS was simultaneously a broker/ dealer and a market maker in the stocks traded, depending on the strategy.
Investment Red Flags
A black-box strategy Madoff's purported track record was so good and so consistent that it should have been suspect. When applied systematically with a monthly rollover, a split-strike conversion strategy can be profitable over long periods but it will also generate some down months and exhibit significant volatility. This was not the case for Madoff, who was down in only ten of 215 months and had very low volatility. No other split-strike conversion manager was able to deliver such a consistent track record.
Investors have brought about several possible explanations for this seeming anomaly. Let us mention some of them: • Market intelligence: Madoff could have added value by stock picking and market timing. Indeed, the results of a basic splitstrike conversion strategy can be improved by carefully selecting the basket of stocks to purchase, adjusting the exercise prices of the options to the volatility smiles and entering or exiting the strategy dynamically. Madoff's edge would then have been his ability to gather and process market-order-flow information from the massive amount of order flow BMIS handled each day, and then use this information to implement optimally his split-strike option strategy. However, it is highly unlikely that over seventeen long years this edge would not once have failed him.
• Front running: Madoff could have used the information from his market-making division to trade in securities ahead of placing orders he received from clients. However, this practice would have been illegal in the US.
• Subsidised returns: Madoff could have used the capital provided by feeders as pseudo-equity; for instance, he could have leveraged positions without explicitly having to borrow, or done more market making by purchasing additional order flow. In exchange, some of the profits made on the market making could have been used to subsidise and smooth the returns of the strategy. However, Madoff himself dismissed this explanation, as his firm used no leverage and had very little inventory.
So, it seems that no one has been able to explain how Madoff was able to deliver the results he did for so long. The only explanation might be to call it a "black box". Lhabitant (2006) suggests a variety of factor models and dynamic benchmark portfolios to analyse hedge funds on the basis of their track records. But none give particularly illuminating results when applied to Madoff's track record. 2 One of them, nevertheless, should be mentioned. As illustrated by Markov (2008) , when style analysis is used, the combination of factors that best explains the returns of Madoff's strategy was a dynamic portfolio of long S&P 100, long cash, short the CBOE S&P 500 Buy-Write Indices and long the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index. 3 The explanatory power remains very low, but these results are very strange. While Madoff's split-strike conversion required a long put, short call and long index position, they suggest that Madoff was doing exactly the inverse, i.e., selling puts and buying calls, of what he claimed to be doing. This contradiction should at the very least have triggered some questions, so that his track record could be understood from a quantitative perspective.
Questionable style exposures
Incoherent 13F filings
In the US, investment managers who exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more of assets must use 13F forms to make quarterly disclosures of their holdings the SEC. These forms, which are publicly available, contain the names and "class of the securities, the CUSIP number, the number of shares owned and the total market value of each security" (SEC 2004) . Interestingly, while Madoff had over $17 billion of positions, his 13F
A Long List of Red Flags
form usually contained only smatterings of small positions in small (non-S&P 100) equities. Madoff's explanation was that his strategy was mostly in cash at the end of each quarter to avoid making public information about the securities he was trading on a discretionary basis. Again, this explanation beggars belief; if Madoff had been doing as he said there would have been massive movements on money markets.
Market size
Executing a split-strike conversion strategy with over $17 billion of capital would have been prohibitively expensive using S&P100 options, which are much less widely used than S&P500 options. Given the daily trading volume, option prices would have experienced sharp moves in the wrong direction for Madoff. None of that happened. When questioned about the discrepancy between the daily trading volumes and his alleged needs, Madoff supposedly explained that he primarily used OTC markets. But that explanation is unconvincing. First, there are not so many counterparties that could be consistently ready to sell cheap insurance every month-and spend seventeen years losing money. Second, the counterparty credit exposures for firms that could have done such trades were likely to be too large for these firms to approve. And third, some of these counterparties would have hedged their books, and there was no indication of such movements. Not surprisingly, the names of these alleged counterparties could never be confirmed, and no option arbitrageur ever saw one of Madoff's trades. This should have suggested that Madoff could not be doing what he said he was doing.
Some Saw It Coming
In the close-knit hedge fund community, noise and rumours are plentiful. Unless they can be rebutted swiftly and decisively, with clear and verifiable evidence, they should not be ignored, particularly when they last for several weeks or months. In the case of Madoff, the press was for once ahead of regulators, politicians and professional investors. For instance, a May 2001 article, titled "Madoff tops charts; sceptics asks how" and published in the now defunct semimonthly industry publication MAR/Hedge, seriously questioned Madoff's track record, operations and secretive investment methods. A subsequent detailed analysis in Barrons, titled "Don't ask, don't tell", raised the same question and concluded with: "some on Wall Street remain sceptical about how Madoff achieves such stunning double-digit returns using options alone". But these articles apparently triggered no reaction from regulators and did not curb the enthusiasm for investing with Madoff.
The most tenacious Madoff opponent was, in all likelihood, Harry Markopolos, a former money manager and investment investigator. In May 1999, Markopolos started a campaign to persuade the SEC's Boston office that Madoff's returns could not be legitimate. But his reports were laden with frothy opinions and provided no definitive evidence of a crime, so the SEC paid little attention. Markopolos nevertheless continued his repeated requests, which culminated in November 2005 with a seventeen-page letter titled "The world's largest hedge fund is a fraud". In this letter, Markopolos listed twenty-nine red flags that suggested again that Madoff was either frontrunning his customer orders or operating "the world's largest Ponzi scheme". This time, the SEC's New York office followed up on Markopolos's tips and investigated
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BMIS and one of its feeders. It found no evidence of front running or of a Ponzi scheme, but a few technical violations surfaced that were rapidly corrected. 4 Since these violations "were not so serious as to warrant an enforcement action", the case was closed. In early 2008, Markopolos tried again to capture the attention of the SEC's Washington office, but obtained no response. These repeated failures by regulators to pursue investigations will certainly be examined and discussed extensively in the near future, but Markopolos's letters should have been a warning sign for investors.
Finally, several banks refused to do business with Madoff. One of them in particular blacklisted Madoff in its asset management division and banned its brokering side from trading with BMIS. Several professional advisors and due diligence firms attempted to analyse the strategy and/or some of its feeder funds and struck them from their list of approved investments. No need for complex techniques: as an illustration, Madoff would have been considered a "problem fund" using the Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz (2008) methodology, which uses only public information from the Form ADV. But some investors allowed greed to overrule advice and continued to flow in in good faith, trusting only what they saw, i.e., the returns.
15
The Madoff collapse is likely to end up being a costly lesson in due diligence. Some may have thought the returns were too good to pass up or Madoff too respectable to look into. Others were perhaps reassured by personal ties with the manager or by word-of-mouth endorsements from friends-former friends, perhaps. All chose faith over evidence. The reality is that the warning signals were there and the salient operational features common to best-ofbreed hedge funds were missing. Let us hope that this will serve as a reminder that the reputation and track record of a manager, no matter how lengthy or impressive, cannot be the sole justification for investment.
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